Our purpose is to describe elliptic curves with complex multiplication which in characteristic 2 have the following useful properties for constructing Diffie-HeUman type cryptosystems: (1) they are nonsupersingular (so that one cannot use the Menezes-Okamoto-Vanstone reduction of discrete log from elliptic curves to finite fields); (2) the order of the group h a s a large prime factor (so that discrete logs cannot be computed by giant-step/baby-step or the PolIard rho method); (3) doubling of points can be carried out almost as efficiently as in the case of the supersingular curves used by Vanstone; (4) the curves are easy to find.
Introduction
In Atkin's version of the Goldwasser-Kilian primality test ([l] , [9] ) one starts with a quadratic imaginary field Ii' = Q(m) and then constructs an elliptic curve over a finite field which is the reduction of an elliptic curve with complex multiplication by K . This idea can also be applied to the search for elliptic curvea which are suitable for the type of cryptosystem described in [3], [8] . 4 s in the primality test, we are looking for elliptic curves whose number of points is equal to a large prime number times a small factor. However, unlike in the prirnality test, where the curves are defined over very large prime fields. our curves will be defined over small fields. Morcover, we shall be interested in an additional property of the curves, the property of having a small trace of Frobenius. In particular, we shall stirdy curves over small fields of characteristic 2 for which the trace of the Frobenius map is kl, i.e., for which the complexmultiplicationfield is Q(m) for D = 2'+2 -1 a Mersenne number. Such curves lend themselves to particularly efficient computation, since the doubling of points (more precisely, multiplying points by 2 k ) can be speeded up when this condition holds.
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Anomalous curves
An elliptic curve E defined over the field F, of p elements will be called "anomalous" if the trace of the Frobenius map (the map (2, y) w (I,, yq)) is equal to 1. Equivalently, an "anomalous" curve over F, is one for which the number of Fg-points is equal t o p.' On an anomalous elliptic curve E over F,, the Frobenius map 'p satisfies the characteristic
We shall also be interested in the "twist" E of E , whose Frobenius satisfies T2+T+p = 0 (the number of F,-points on is p + 2). By the %-twist" En of E we mean the twist of the curve E regarded as a curve over the extension field F,. ( The most important case for practical implementation is q = 2'. In that case, the computation of 'p : (x,y) L. (xzk,gZk) on an Fp.-point is accomplished by a shift operation of negligible time. Thus, if we want to multiply a point P by 2k on an anomalous curve, the fastest way to do this is to use the identity p2 -p + 2k = 0 , i.e., 2'P = cp(P) -cp2(P), since instead of k additions of points we need only perform one.
(On the twisted curve E , one analogously has 2'P = -cp(P) -'p'(P).)
I
The greater efficiency obtained if one can double points by taking squares in F2-was first realized by Menezes and Vanstone (61, who were working with curves defined over Fz whose Frobenius map has trace 0, i.e., satisfies the relation T 2 + 2 = 0. In that case, since 2P = -p 2 ( P ) , no addition of points is required, i.e., doubling of points is "free." However, curves with 0 trace of Frobenius are supersingular. In [7] it was shown that the discrete log problem on a supersingular elliptic curve reduces to the discrete log problem in the multiplicative group of a finite field of about the same size. That is, supersingular elliptic curve cryptosystems are now known to be no more secure than the original Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem in a small extension of the underlying finite field. For this reason we shall keep away from curves whose Frobenius map cp has trace 0. The anomalous curves -those for which cp has trace 1 -are the "next best thing."
In general, for given q the equation of an anomalous elliptic curve over F, can be found (b) I n the special case q = 2, a n y of the multiples 2'P f o r 15 4 can be computed wiih a single addition of points.
Proof. Part (a) follows from the above discussion.
(b) In the case q = 2 , a t first it might seem that an anomalous curve has no advantage, because computing 2P = P+ P takes only one addition of points anyway. However, if we use the relation T -T 2 = 2 satisfied by v, iterate and simplify, we obtain the following polynomial identities satisfied by the map cp (which is defined on the Fzn-points of E by %,Y)
P(SX,Y4
(The analogous formulas on the twist E are obtained from these by replacing T by -T.)
Thus, in computing t P , any string of 1 5 4 zeros can be handled with a single addition of points, as claimed.
Roughly speaking, if one uses k's of small Hamming size, one gets doubling of points "almost 3/4 for free." If E has equation y2 + z y = f3(z) for f3(t) E F2[z] of degree 3 (an explicit equation will be given below), and if P = P(z,y) is an F2--point1 then the above binomials in T lead to simple formulas for 2'P, 1 5 4, for example: 8 P(.,y) = P(z~,z8+y~) + P ( Z 3 3 J 3 2 ) .
Alternately, as Victor Miller pointed out to me, for k arbitrary it is efficient to write L to the base 16 and precompute EoP for 1 5 Lo < 16. Then if one uses the last formula above t o compute lg P , it is easy to see that on the average the number of additions of points is less than 1/3 of the expected number of additions of points required with the repeated doubling method based on the binary expansion of k.
Number of points
Let E be an anomalous curve over F,, and let be its n-twist. Then there is a simple relationship between the number N,, (resp. G,,) of Fp.-points on E (resp. on E n ) and the root cy = (1 + 4 7 ) / 2 of the characteristic polynomial T2 -T + q. Namely, N , = I Q " -11*, G n = Ian + 1)'. This leads to a very simple algorithm for computing N , and Nn: first compute the Fibonacci-type sequence a,, given by a0 = 2, (11 = 1, ant1 = a, -qan-1 for n 2 1; then N,, = q" + 1 -a,, and N,, = q" + 1 + an--
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Once we have an anomalous curve E defined over F,, we want to find an extension field Fg= such that the number N,, of F,p-points on E or the number Nn of Fgn-points on En is divisible by a large prime (say, of at least 30 digits). Because Nn = la" -11'
and Nn = I Q " + 112, it follows that N,,,IN,, whenever nlln and Gnl1i?,, whenever n/nl is an odd integer. SO if N , (resp. En) is to be a product of a small factor and a large prime, we must take tz equal to a prime (resp. equal either to a prime or else to a prime times a very small power of 2). In summary, the above elliptic curves all give rise to Diffie-Hellman type cryptosysterns which are secure at our present level of knowledge and technology. The examples in $4 have the additional feature that, when computing a multiple kP, any string of 5 4 zeros in the binary representation of k can be handled with only a single addition of points. In the case of the examples in $5.1 (respectively, $5.11, $5.111) a string of 2 (resp. 3, 4) zeros in k can be handled with a single addition of points.
6 Some aspects of efficient implementation Balanced binary expansion. As noted in [lo] , one can take advantage of the fact that subtracting points on an elliptic curve is as easy as adding. For example, instead of computing 1 5 P as P + 2 ( P + 2 ( P + 2 P ) ) , it is moreefficient to compute 2(2(2(2P)))-P. This is different from exponentiation in a finite field, where it would take longer to compute ( ( ( a 2 ) ') ') / a than Q ( a ( a . a?) ') 2 , because division takes much longer than multiplication.
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Suppose YOU want t o compute kP. The following algorithm, which is equivalent to the second algorithm in [lo], will give k as a sum of a minimal number of powers of 2 with coefficients &l: move from right to left in the binary expansion of k, replacing eacn sequence of two or more 1-bits 11.. . I 1 by 1 0 0 . . .0-1. We shall call the result the "balanced binary expansion" of k. The balanced binary expansion of an arbitrary k is likely to have more sequences of several 0's than its binary expansion. In fact, it is simple to show that on the average 2/3 of a number's balanced binary digits are 0. Thus, when we are computing on the anomalous curves in $4, the easy step of converting k to balanced binary will generally enable US to compute kP faster, because of the circumstance that any string of 5 4 zeros can be handled with a single addition of points. For example, to compute 1 5 P = 16P-P requires only 2 additions of points.
In a Diffie-Hellman type key exchange, where one multiplies points by randomly generated r-bit integers k, one The following is an even more efficient key exchange procedure. It is based on a suggestion of Hendrik Lenstra.
Base-cp expansion. Again suppose that we are working in the group of Fzn-points of the anomalous F2-curve E : yz + ey = z3 + I + 1 or its twist k : y2 + zy = t3 + 1.
Then on E the Frobenius map 'p : ( I , y) -( r 2 , y2) is the element A = (1 + G ) / 2 of the endomorphism ring Z[(-1 + f l ) / 2 ] (on E it is K = (-1 + f l ) / 2 ) . In the key exchange protocol, instead of choosing a random r-bit positive integer n whose balanced binary expansion has Hamming size 5 s, each player now chooses a linear combination n of the pJ! 0 5 j < r , with coefficients cj = 0 or +l, such that 5 s of the coefficients are nonzero. Then computing R P = C cj ( P ) requires only 5 s -1 additions of points, and we have recaptured the efficiency of working with supersingular curves.
One could also compute arbitrary multiples n P , where now n E 2, by representing n "to the base 9.'' Namely, since cp = ( f 1 + f l ) / 2 is an element of norm 2 in the Euclidean domain 2 [( 1 + &7)/2], any element of the ring -in particular, n -has a unique representation in the form C c j @ , where c j E ( 0 , l ) .
We can also obtain a "balanced cp-expansion" of n as follows. Recall that p satisfies ~( l -p) = 2 on E (it satisfies -cp(l+cp) = 2 on E). We shall work on E (the argument for is analogous with the p-expansion replaced by the (-p)-expansion). Write n = no + 2nl+2n2, where no E (0, l} and n2 is the part of the pexpansion of (n-n0)/2 consisting of all runs of >_ 2 consecutive l-bits. Note that 2(1+ p + 'p2 + . . . + #-I) = 'p -y9".
Hence we replace each sequence of j 2 2 consecutive l-bits 11. + .
11 in the expansion of n2 by -1 000.. . l o in the expansion of 2n2.
But unfortunately, expressing an arbitrary n as a balanced cpexpansion will not necessarily be more efficient than using its balanced binary expansion. This is because the p-expansion of n has approximately twice as many bits as the binary expansion. The following example illustrates why the base p does not generally have an advantage over the base 2.
Example. Consider the group of Fe-points of E : y' + zy = r3 + z2 + 1, which has order 14. Suppose we want to compute 1OP. Using the binary expansion, we take 2 ( P + 4P), which requires 3 additions. Since the base+ expansion of 5 is 100101, computing 1OP = (p5 + p2 + 1)2P also requires 3 additions. Note that if we happen to know that 'p acts as -3 on the Fa-points of E , and so 10 = p2 + I, then we can compute 1OP with a single addition of points. However, in the general case of Fan-points it is not clear how to obtain a cp-expansion of n that is much shorter than the one that comes from the Euclidean algorithm in the ring Z[(1 + -)/2].
